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ABSTRACT 
The article critically examines the way in which the Constitutional Court dealt with the 
issue of racism in South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration and others 2017 (1) SA 549 (CC). Invoking general legal principles 
blended with critical race theory, we show that the apex court erred in finding that an 
employee who had racially abused his superior by referring to him as a kaffir needed to be 
compensated for a dismissal that arose from such racial abuse. We show that even with a 
finding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair, existing legal principles, racial justice 
and social transformation imperatives negated the court making a finding that 
compensation was due to the employee. The racism involved was so vile and brazen that a 
compensation award was not only inappropriate in the circumstances but had the 
consequence of sending a wrong message to the general public, black people in particular, 
that the law and the courts are still tolerant of racists and racism. Ordinary black people 
are likely to read the judgment as the law rewarding racists for being racist. The article 
calls upon the courts to take racism and the racial oppression of black people seriously by 
acting firmly against those found guilty of racial abuse.         
Keywords: Racism; colour-blindness; workplace racial oppression; racial justice; 
judicial choice; social transformation; exceptions to procedural fairness. 
 
“If the battleground against racism has shifted to the trial courts, the chief artillery [if that 
battle is to be won] has to be the trial judge himself. He is the one in absolute command; he 
is the sole repository of that tremendous force for good or evil which we call ‘judicial 
discretion’.”1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa has a long, painful and well documented history of legalised racism that 
refuses to end.2 Hardly a month goes by without a racial incident making headline news. 
The Constitutional Court itself has noted the stubborn nature of racism in City of 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum & another where Mogoeng CJ remarked 
that racism in South Africa “is a system so stubborn that its divisive and harmful effects 
continue to plague us and retard our progress as a nation more than two decades into 
our hard-earned constitutional democracy”3. 
Although racial oppression and racial prejudice exist everywhere in the world in 
one form or another4, the mainstay of racism in South Africa is the fact that our racism 
 
1  Crockett G “Racism in the courts” (1971) 20(2) Journal of Public Law 385 at 388. 
2  See for example Dlamini CRM “The influence of race on the administration of justice in South Africa” 
(1988) 4 South African Journal on Human Rights 37 at 37. 
3  See City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum & another 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) at para 4. 
4  See Naicker L “The role of eugenics and religion in the construction of race in South Africa” (2012) 
38(2) Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 209 at 209. 
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was both institutionalised and legalised.5 By institutionalised and legalised we mean 
that racial oppression of, and racial prejudice against, black people in South Africa were 
never only a function of official government policy, but were also legally entrenched and 
visible in the statute books6, the court processes and proceedings7, as well as in the 
composition of the judiciary. Abel makes the point that black people “were charged 
under laws they had no role in enacting [and were] prosecuted and heard by men they 
had no say in appointing”8. So legally entrenched was our racism, that Pitt correctly 
observed that “[t]he most striking feature of law in South Africa [was] that it was largely 
directed against black [people]”9.    
That the law favoured, protected, benefitted and exclusively served the interests of 
whites is now a fact of historical import. In serving only the interests of whites, the law 
enabled and facilitated racial oppression. Black people were deliberately excluded from 
claiming any benefit from, or protection under, the law. As a result of this, black people, 
justifiably so, distrusted the law, became suspicious of the law and most importantly, 
lost all confidence in the administration of justice.10 The end result of this was that the 
law and the legal system suffered a crisis of legitimacy amongst many black people.11 
The crisis of legitimacy faced by the legal system ended, or so many thought, with 
the advent of the new constitutional order that promised, as it does, equality before the 
law,12 human dignity,13 freedom and non-racialism.14 So widely held was this belief and 
so firm was the hope in the new constitution, that Froneman J, as he then was, remarked 
 
5  See Rubin N “Law, race and colour in South Africa” (1974) 4(3) Journal of Opinion 6 at 6; Gravett WH 
“The myth of objectivity: implicit racial bias and the law (part 1)” (2017) 20 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1 at 1.  
6  See for example statutes like the Native Land Act 27 of 1913 which dispossessed black people of land; 
the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 which forced residential segregation; the Immorality Act 5 of 1927 
which imposed racial barriers on marriage and sex; the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 which racially 
differentiated schooling; and the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 which excluded black workers 
from being employees.  
7  See for example R v Pitje 1960 (4) SA 709 (A), where an attorney had to address the court from a 
“blacks only table”.  
8  Abel R Politics by other means: law in the struggle against apartheid, 1980 – 1994: New York: Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group (2015) at 382.  
9  Pitts J “Note: Public interest law in South Africa” (1986) 22 Stanford Journal of International Law 153 at 
154. 
10 Dlamini (1988) at 39. 
11 For a detailed discussion on the legitimacy of our legal system see Olivier M “Is the South African 
magistracy legitimate?” (2001) 118 South African Law Journal at 166; Olivier M & Baloro J “Towards a 
legitimate South African judiciary: transformation, independence and the promotion of democracy” 
(2001) 26 Journal for Juridical Science at 31. 
12  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
13  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
14  Sections 1(a) and 1(b) of the Constitution. 
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in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order that “the previous constitutional system of this 
country was the fundamental mischief to be remedied by the new Constitution”15 . 
With the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(Constitution) many believed, naively as it turned out, that South Africa had finally 
cleansed itself of its institutionalised and legalised racism which had permeated every 
facet of life including the workplace. This was the case because the adoption of the 
Constitution was thought to have marked a decisive break from a past in which racism 
was accepted, institutionalised and legitimised in various ways.16 Some judges even 
declared that the “Constitution has changed the ‘context’ of all legal thought and 
decision-making in South Africa”17. 
Anecdotal evidence however suggests that despite the Constitution and the 
promises it makes, not much has changed in our race relations. Racial oppression 
remains alive and well in South Africa, whilst racial equality and racial justice remain a 
distant dream. The promises of the Constitution have not filtered through to break the 
back of racism. Instead, in some cases the Constitution appears to have emboldened 
racists to continue to use the law and the legal system to score undeserved victories 
against the very same black people they racially abuse and discriminate against. A case 
in point is South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (SARS (2017)).18 This case is likely to be read by many black people, and 
justifiably so, as yet another instance of the law and the legal system working in favour 
of whites against the racially abused and victimised blacks.19 
The SARS judgment concerned the fairness of the dismissal of an employee, a Mr 
Kruger, who had been found guilty of having racially abused his superior by indirectly 
calling him a kaffir in the workplace. The Constitutional Court, which is tasked not only 
with the duty to interpret the Constitution, but also with an obligation to bring about 
social transformation, ordered that the employee be compensated for the resultant 
dismissal. This article takes issue with the way in which the Constitutional Court 
decided this case. The reasoning of the Court and the outcome that it reached are wholly 
unsatisfactory as the apex court missed an opportunity to send a strong message to all 
racists that the Constitution, and indeed our legal system, can no longer be used as 
refuge for racists. 
The thrust of our argument is that properly considered, the SARS judgment 
represents yet another case where the law appears to have ignored black pain, 
rubbished black exclusion and marginalisation, and instead, showed itself to be an ally 
of racists. Put differently, the SARS judgment appears to us as another example where 
the law revealed that the deeply held belief that the law is neutral, apolitical, colour 
 
15  Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order & another 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) at 635B. 
16  Rustenburg Platinum Mine v SAEWA obo Bester [2016] ZALCJHB 75 at para 21. 
17  See Holomisa v Argus Newspaper Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 618D. 
18  2017 (1) SA 549 (CC). 
19  This term, whenever it is used here, is not used in a pejorative way, but only as a collective term to 
refer to black people. 
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blind or objective is in fact a myth to be dispelled. On the contrary, properly considered 
the SARS judgment shows that law is both violent and instrumental in the maintenance 
of white privilege and white domination despite the transformative objectives of the 
Constitution.20 The law remains as friendly and comfortable with racists today as it was 
before the adoption of the Constitution. This case shows in clear terms that despite the 
official demise of apartheid in 1994, our law remains “instrumental in the 
marginalisation and exclusion of blacks and in perpetuating deep inequalities between 
whites and blacks”21 . 
In making our argument, we proceed from the premise that acknowledges that law 
is anything but neutral, apolitical or even objective. Law, or the interpretation and 
application thereof, is a product of judicial choice, which judicial choice may either be 
liberal or conservative, transformative or formalistic. For this reason, we locate the 
reasoning and the outcome the Constitutional Court reached on the judicial choice it 
chose to follow, which judicial choice has the effect of perpetuating entrenched racism 
rather than dismantling it. Whilst inspired by and drawing from critical race theory, we 
show, purely on the existing legal doctrines, that the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court is susceptible to criticism.  
The judgment can be criticised on at least five grounds. First, as we shall show, the 
Constitutional Court adopted a denialist, colour-blind approach to the issue of racism 
which denialist approach was presented as neutral, impartial and objective 
adjudication. This denialist and colour-blind approach, we shall argue, is compatible 
with the very nature of racial oppression and racism the Chief Justice decried as 
horrendous. Secondly, the Constitutional Court invoked a strained construction and 
application of procedural fairness. Thirdly, the Constitutional Court appears to have 
forgotten that its duty was to search for substantive justice which required it to examine 
not only the alleged procedural wrong done to the complainant, but also the extent to 
which that procedural wrong prevented justice from being done. Fourthly, 
transformative constitutionalism requires courts to always assess the social impact and 
message their judgments make in the lives and minds of ordinary South Africans. This 
judgment is bound to have a negative impact in the minds of black people who continue 
to be at the receiving end of racism. Lastly, while the judgment deals with important 
debates about the influence of the Constitution in fostering social change, the outcome 
the judgment reaches is a far cry from any transformative ideal; in fact, the judgment is 
a statement of a failure by our highest court to decisively reject racism.22 We expand on 
these criticisms after a brief narration of the facts of the case as well as the judgment of 
the Constitutional Court. 
 
 
20  Modiri J “The crises in legal education” (2014) 46(3) Acta Academica 1 at 6. 
21 Modiri J “The colour of law, power and knowledge: introducing critical race theory In  
(post-)apartheid South Africa” (2012) 28 South African Journal on Human Rights 405 at 406. 
22  Modiri J “Race as/and the trace of the ghost: jurisprudential escapism, horizontal anxiety and the right 
to be racist in BOE Trust Limited” (2013) 16(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Review 582 at 583. 
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2 BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 
The case concerned a South African Revenue Services (SARS) employee, a Mr Kruger 
(Kruger), who, after an altercation, referred to his superior in the workplace as a kaffir. 
Verbatim Kruger is said to have charged “Ek kan nie verstaan hoe kaffirs dink nie,”23 
and that “A kaffir must not tell me what to do”24. This racial charge caused SARS, the 
employer, to institute a disciplinary process against Kruger where he was charged with 
misconduct.    
At the disciplinary hearing Kruger pleaded guilty to the charges preferred against 
him and a shockingly lenient sanction was imposed by the chairperson of the 
disciplinary hearing. Kruger was served a final written warning valid for six months, 
placed on suspension without pay for ten days, and ordered to undergo counselling.25 
This sanction, as shockingly lenient as it was, appears to have been negotiated and 
agreed to by all present in the disciplinary hearing, including the SARS representative. 
When the disciplinary report was handed to the SARS Commissioner for 
implementation, the SARS Commissioner refused to give effect to the sanction as 
prescribed by the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing and, instead, elected to 
unilaterally change the sanction from a final written warning to a dismissal.26 This 
unilateral change of sanction incensed Kruger who complained that his right to be heard 
before an adverse decision was made against him had been violated ,and that the SARS 
Commissioner, in terms of the collective agreement in place, did not have the powers to 
unilaterally change the sanction. Kruger then referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). Unsurprisingly, and 
based on a collective agreement in place between SARS and the trade unions as well as 
case law, the CCMA found that the SARS Commissioner did not have the powers to 
unilaterally change the sanction imposed by the chairperson of the disciplinary 
hearing.27 Based on these factors the CCMA accordingly found Kruger’s dismissal to 
have been unfair. It then reinstated the chairperson’s sanction which had the effect of 
reinstating Kruger in his employment at SARS.28    
Feeling aggrieved by the CCMA’s arbitration award reinstating Kruger, SARS 
approached the Labour Court for a review of the arbitration award, and then the Labour 
Appeal Court after its review was dismissed by the Labour Court. The Labour Appeal 
Court also dismissed the appeal prompting SARS to approach the Constitutional Court. 
Although we may refer to the judgments of the Labour and Labour Appeal courts, that 
will be in passing and for the sake of clarity, as it is the Constitutional Court’s judgment 
that is the focus of the discussion. 
 
23  Direct translation: “I can’t understand how kaffirs think.” 
24  See SARS (2017) at para 15. 
25  See SARS (2017) at para 16. 
26  See SARS (2017) at para 18. 
27  See SARS (2017) at paras 20 -21. 
28  See SARS (2017) at para 21. 
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3 SARS v CCMA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S JUDGMENT 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court first had to deal with issues unrelated to the fairness 
of Kruger’s dismissal. This was the case because SARS first attempted to settle the 
matter with Kruger by offering him compensation for the dismissal if he agreed to walk 
away.29 SARS also appeared to have made a representation to Kruger that no further 
appeal will be instituted after the Labour Appeal Court’s judgment. Kruger turned down 
what amounted to a golden handshake offer30 and demanded reinstatement on the 
terms prescribed by the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry. Faced with this 
insistence from Kruger, SARS then reneged on its undertaking that it would not appeal 
to the Constitutional Court after the Labour Appeal Court’s judgment, and instead 
approached the Constitutional Court.   
With SARS retracting its undertaking not to appeal and approaching the 
Constitutional Court, Kruger naturally sought to rely on the undertaking and argued 
that SARS had perempted31 its right to appeal to the Constitutional Court and as such 
the Constitutional Court should not grant leave to appeal.32 The Constitutional Court 
then had to first determine if Kruger’s defence of peremption militated against it 
granting leave to appeal. On the point of peremption the Constitutional Court found that 
peremption had indeed taken place but that there were overriding constitutional 
considerations that justified hearing the appeal and militated against the enforcement 
of peremption. The Court on the strength of Minister of Defence v South African National 
Defence Force Union reasoned that 
“where the enforcement of [peremption] would not advance the interests of 
justice, then [the] overriding constitutional standard for appealability would 
have to be accorded its force by purposefully departing from the abundantly 
clear decision not to appeal33”. 
Accordingly, realising that the “central feature of this case [was] the mother of all 
historical and stubbornly persistent problems in our country: undisguised racism”34 the 
Constitutional Court dismissed Kruger’s contention of peremption and decided to grant 
leave to appeal. We take no issue with that stance.  
 
29  See SARS (2017) at para 51. 
30  A  Golden Handshake in this context is best understood as some incentive, usually monetary, given to 
an employee to leave his employment quietly. See generally Schmall LA “Telling the truth about golden 
handshakes: exit incentives and fiduciary duties (2001) 5(1) Employee Rights and Employment Policy 
Journal 169 at 170. 
31  See Dabner v South African Railways and Harbours 1920 AD 583 at 594: “The rule with regard to 
peremption is well settled, and has been enunciated on several occasions by this Court.  If the conduct 
of an unsuccessful litigant is such as to point indubitably and necessarily to the conclusion that he does 
not intend to attack the judgment, then he is held to have acquiesced in it. But the conduct relied upon 
must be unequivocal and must be inconsistent with any intention to appeal.” 
32  See SARS (2017) at para 24. 
33  See SARS (2017) at para 28. 
34  See SARS (2017) at para 29. 
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After granting leave to appeal the Constitutional Court had to then decide the 
appeal on its merits. On the merits of the appeal the Constitutional Court correctly 
noted that SARS was in effect attacking the reinstatement part of the arbitration award 
and as such the only question it was called upon to decide was whether it was 
appropriate or reasonable to reinstate Kruger.35 On this question, after considering the 
test for review that the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court ought to have applied 
when confronted with the CCMA’s arbitration award, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that reinstatement was not a reasonable decision a reasonable decision 
maker would have made considering that Kruger was guilty of racism in the workplace. 
In arriving at this finding Mogoeng CJ for the unanimous Constitutional Court held that 
in using the term kaffir when referring to his superior, Kruger was implying that 
“[as far as he was concerned none] of his African colleagues was in his world-
view worthy of effectively exercising authority over him. His was a 
demonstration of the worst kind of contempt, racism, and insubordination. A 
proper reflection on these racial statements alone would have been enough to 
lead the Arbitrator to the inescapable conclusion that reinstatement was the 
most inappropriate remedy”36. 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment would have been defendable had the Constitutional 
Court stopped here, but the Court decided to go a step further and criticised, unfairly so, 
the approach adopted by the CCMA. In this instance Mogoeng CJ went a step further and 
held that “[a]fter concluding that Mr Kruger’s dismissal was unfair, the Arbitrator 
immediately ordered his reinstatement without taking into account the provisions of 
section 193(2) [of the Labour Relations Act (LRA)]”37. This was an unfair criticism of the 
CCMA because the Chief Justice had in the earlier parts of the judgment acknowledged 
that the “referral to the CCMA was on a somewhat tightly defined basis”38 relating to 
“the legal impermissibility of the Commissioner’s substitution of the sanction, during 
the lifespan of the collective agreement that binds SARS”39. 
On this acknowledgment it should be clear that the CCMA never considered if 
Kruger’s reinstatement was appropriate as that was not the dispute it was called upon 
to decide. The reason why the CCMA did not consider the provisions of section 193(2) 
had to do with the way in which the dispute was framed rather than with any omission 
or misdirection on its part. The reinstatement of Kruger was not ordered by the CCMA 
but was the natural consequence of setting aside SARS’s decision to unilaterally 
substitute the chairperson’s sanction which the Constitutional Court did not say was 
incorrect. From the way the dispute was framed it is hard to imagine how the CCMA 
would have considered section 193(2). It is on this basis that we say Mogoeng’s 
criticism of the CCMA was unfair. 
 
35  See SARS (2017) at para 34.  
36  See SARS (2017) at para 42. 
37  See SARS (2017) at para 44.                                            
38  See SARS (2017) at para 18.  
39  See SARS (2017) at para 18. 
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Despite the fact that the case was always narrowly framed to look at whether SARS 
had powers to substitute the disciplinary chairperson’s sanction in light of the collective 
agreement in place, and whether it could do the substitution without affording the 
affected employee a hearing, the Constitutional Court when seized with the matter 
somewhat broadened the enquiry to consider if it was appropriate to reinstate Kruger. 
It was on this broadened enquiry that it became necessary to consider and even apply 
the provisions of section 193(2) read with section 194(1) of the LRA. In doing so the 
Constitutional Court concluded that no matter how vile a racist Kruger had shown 
himself to be, he was still entitled to compensation as that was the just and equitable 
remedy for his unprocedural dismissal by SARS. Kruger was accordingly awarded six 
months’ salary.40 In coming to this conclusion, the Constitutional Court, we argue, 
stretched the law, downplayed race and its influence, and overlooked several key and 
relevant factors which open the judgment to criticism. 
 
4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF JUDGMENT 
4.1 Denial of racism only serves to perpetuate its existence  
SARS (2017) was, to state the obvious, a case about racism, white privilege and racial 
domination. Yet, in the judgment these issues, individually or collectively, are either 
ignored or were mentioned in passing. The Constitutional Court was content to 
passively see the case as nothing more than a labour dispute where the complainant 
was deprived of procedural fairness by an unruly organ of State.41 Despite this passive 
characterisation, racism still loomed so large in the case that Mogoeng CJ saw it 
necessary to warn himself and the other judges against getting passionately involved 
with the case. In this regard he said:  
“Judicial Officers must be very careful not to get sentimentally connected to 
any of the issues being reviewed. No overt or subtle or emotional alignments 
are to stealthily or unconsciously find their way into their approach to the 
issues, however much the parties might seek to appeal to their emotions. To be 
caught up in that web, as a Judicial Officer, amounts to a dismal failure in the 
execution of one’s constitutional duties and the worst betrayal of the obligation 
to do the right thing, in line with the affirmation or oath of office.”42 
Although this may appear as a harmless and neutral obiter remark calling upon judges 
to be objective, emotionless and apolitical in the execution of their judicial tasks, it is 
not. The law and the cases that reflect that law are not neutral, emotionless or harmless. 
This statement was a warning against seeing the case for what it was truly about – 
white privilege seeking to assert itself. The statement was a classical call to adopt a 
 
40  See SARS (2017) at para 58. 
41  The Constitutional Court warned against passive adjudication in Pitje v Shibambo 2016 (4) BCLR 460 
(CC) at para 19. See also Nkosi T “Interpretation, credit reinstatement and judicial disagreement: Nkata 
v First Rand Bank Ltd” (2017) 29 South African Mercantile Law Journal 403 at 414. 
42  See SARS (2017) at para 13. 
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colour-blind43 approach to race and the racial domination of whites. Colour-blindness is 
after all rooted in the belief that race must be ignored or denied because “[i]f people or 
institutions do not even notice race, then they cannot act in a racially biased manner”44. 
This is so because racism is seen as an irrational aberration that is incompatible with 
the law.45 
In essence, Mogoeng CJ was saying that, in deciding the case, judicial officers 
should, in the first instance, refuse to see colour or the racism that was central to the 
case and, in the second instance, not identify with the victims of racism. All that, for 
purposes of adjudication, is irrelevant and unnecessary, and considering or identifying 
with it, constitutes a betrayal of the oath of office. Simply put, race and its role in the 
dispute must be denied. This denial of race is certainly reflected in the conclusion 
reached by the judgment.     
Projecting the case as solely a labour dispute, mired as it were in colour-blindness 
and race denialism, had some practical consequences. First, though purporting to be 
neutral and concerned about the scourge of racism, the judgment fails to directly and 
unapologetically confront racism; instead, because of its race denialism approach, the 
conclusion it reaches stands only to reinforce the structural patterns of racism and 
black subordination. To fight racism, its existence as well as its broader effects and 
manifestations must first be acknowledged. Secondly, reducing the need to 
acknowledge and even identify with the victims of racism to misplaced emotions that 
have no place on the bench has the effect of downplaying the true extent of Kruger’s 
transgressions.  
Properly viewed Kruger was not only guilty of a workplace misdemeanour. His 
conduct was far worse than that and extended beyond the workplace and the 
employment relationship to which the Court sought to confine the dispute. Kruger was 
guilty of a hate crime, which hate crime was directed at a group of people beyond those 
he directly abused.46 Had the Court not adopted its race denialist approach, it would 
have given due regard to this and even refer its judgment to the criminal justice 
authorities to consider taking further action against Kruger as it did in Black Sash Trust 
v Minister of Social Development47. 
 
43  On colour-blindness, its meaning, operation and effects, see Peer D “The colourblind ideal in a race-
conscious reality: the case for a new legal ideal for race relations” (2011) 6 Northwestern Journal of 
Law & Social Policy 473 at 475. 
44 Apfelbaum E, Norton M & Sommers S “Racial color blindness: emergence, practice, and implications”        
(2012) 21  Current Directions in Psychological Science 205 at 205 .  
45  See Modiri J “Race, realism and critique: the politics of race and Afriforum v Malema in the Inequality 
Court” (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 275 at 283. 
46 See generally Naidoo K “The origins of hate crime laws” (2016) 22 Fundamina 53 at 53-66. 
47 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2018 (12) BCLR 1472 (CC). In this case the 
Constitutional Court, acting out of its own volition, referred the conduct of the Minister of Social 
Development to the criminal justice authorities to investigate if perjury charges could be brought against 
her. 
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4.2 Court elevated procedural fairness to an unacceptable standard 
The Constitutional Court’s compensation award to Kruger was clearly premised on the 
Court’s finding that Kruger’s dismissal by an organ of State in the form of SARS was 
procedurally unfair. This is seen from Mogoeng CJ’s reasoning that there is a “need to 
ensure that employers are not inadvertently encouraged by the non-payment of 
compensation to adopt a shotgun approach of dismissing employees without affording 
them the opportunity to be heard”48. Whilst we accept the importance of affording 
employees, especially those employed by organs of State, as Kruger was, opportunities 
to be heard before adverse decisions are taken against them,49 we also note that 
procedural fairness, which is a subset of natural justice, has never been an unqualified 
or inflexible principle in our law. This was said by the Constitutional Court itself in 
President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union50 (SARFU 
(2000)) where it held: 
“The requirement of procedural fairness, which is an incident of natural justice, 
though relevant to hearings before tribunals, is not necessarily relevant to 
every exercise of public power. [There is] no authority for such a proposition, 
nor [is there] authority for the proposition that, whenever prejudice may be 
anticipated, a functionary exercising public power must give a hearing to the 
person or persons likely to be affected by the decision. What procedural 
fairness requires depends on the circumstances of each particular case.”51 
This principle was again repeated by the Constitutional Court in Masetlha v President of 
the Republic52 (Masetlha (2008)) where Moseneke DCJ, for the majority of the Court, 
referring to Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile53 held: 
“It was recognised in Zenzile that the power to dismiss must ordinarily be 
constrained by the requirement of procedural fairness, which incorporates the 
right to be heard ahead of an adverse decision. In my view however, the special 
legal relationship that obtains between the [parties] … is clearly 
distinguishable from the considerations relied upon in Zenzile. One important 
distinguishing feature is that the power to dismiss is an executive function that 
derives from the Constitution and national legislation.”54  
What SARFU (2000) and Masetlha (2008) tell us is that procedural fairness and the 
expectation to be heard may be limited by a number of factors, including the 
circumstances of a particular case, the nature of the relationship between the parties, as 
well as the nature of the power used in making that adverse decision. This of course is 
 
48 See SARS (2017) at para 52. 
49 See generally Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) at 748G. 
50 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
51 See SARFU (2000) at para 219. 
52 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
53 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). 
54  See Masetlha (2008) at para 75. 
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in accordance with what the Labour Appeal Court has been saying about procedural 
fairness, namely, that procedural fairness is by its very nature flexible, depending “in 
each case upon the weighing and balancing of a range of factors including the nature of 
the decision, the rights, interests, and expectations affected by it, the circumstances in 
which the impugned decision is made, and the consequences resulting from it”55 .  
In SARS (2017) the Constitutional Court appears to have taken it as a given that 
procedural fairness was applicable, and because Kruger had not been heard before a 
heavier sanction was imposed, the Court reasoned that it necessarily followed that he 
was due to receive compensation for the procedurally unfair dismissal he had suffered. 
None of the Justices considered weighing or balancing any factors including asking SARS 
to provide good reasons why it had not afforded Kruger a hearing before imposing the 
heavier sanction it imposed. In doing so the Constitutional Court unwittingly elevated 
procedural fairness to a higher standard of absoluteness and inflexibility than was 
previously the case. The Court appears to have mechanically enforced Kruger’s right to 
procedural fairness without balancing that right in a practical sense with, amongst 
others, the misconduct he had committed and his subsequent conduct of trying to 
retract his guilty plea. The Constitutional Court should have followed the dictum laid 
down in National Union of Mineworkers & another v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration & others where the Labour Court in a case where employees 
had been dismissed without a hearing held: 
“… Even if it may be considered that the issue raised by the applicants could 
feasibly constitute some or other form of procedural irregularity, this does not 
by automatic consequence mean that the dismissal of the second applicant was 
procedurally unfair …”.56 
Further, in arriving at this conclusion that Kruger, despite his deplorable conduct, was 
nevertheless due to be compensated, the Constitutional Court certainly appears to have 
neglected to pay due regard to the well-known fact that, because procedural fairness as 
a flexible standard in our labour law is so entrenched, where there has been a deviation 
on the part of the employer, that employer should and is often called upon to explain the 
reasons for the deviation.57 It is only in the absence of a convincing explanation that 
such an employer would be made to pay up for their foolhardiness.58   
If the decision to compensate Kruger was based on SARS having failed to explain 
why it had not heard from Kruger before dismissing him, such a decision would have 
been correct. But the decision was clearly not based on any failure on the part of SARS 
to explain its deviation since the Constitutional Court never approached the matter in 
 
55  Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell (2012) 
33ILJ 2033 (LAC) at para 44. 
56  National Union of Mineworkers & another v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & 
others (2013) 34 ILJ 945 (LC) at para 55. 
57  See generally Cameron E “The right to a hearing before dismissal – part 1” (1986) 7 Industrial Law 
Journal 183 at184. 
58  See Cameron (1986) at 184–187. 
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that way. This, we say, is regrettable, for SARS could have given proper and plausible 
reasons why it did not deem it necessary to hear from Kruger when it decided to change 
the sanction.     
To insist, as the Constitutional Court did, that compensation be awarded to Kruger 
on the basis that his dismissal was procedurally unfair without balancing all the factors 
and interests at play, the Court did not vindicate his procedural rights but unfairly 
elevated procedural fairness to an inflexible rule. The most and immediate likely effect 
of this elevation is that workplace efficiencies will now be “unduly impeded by onerous 
procedural requirements”59 , something the Labour Court has always said we must 
guard against.    
The last point we make here is that procedural fairness, whether in the labour 
sphere or at common law where it is expressed through the maxim audi alteram partem, 
has always admitted exceptions to its operation. In R v Ngwevela for example the Court 
both highlighted the importance of procedural fairness and the fact that it admits 
exceptions in the following terms: 
“… [T]here may be special circumstances which would justify a public official, 
acting in good faith, to take action, even if he did not give an opportunity to the 
person affected to make any relevant statement or to correct or to controvert 
any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice.”60 
In Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief Schreiner JA warned about the dangers 
of failing to appreciate that procedural fairness, as important as it is, is nonetheless a 
context specific rule. In this regard the Judge of Appeal held that procedural fairness 
was undoubtedly an important rule to observe, but so, held the Court, “its value would 
be lessened rather than increased if it were applied outside of its proper limits61”. The 
dangers that arise with the elevation of procedural fairness in the SARS (2017) 
judgment are easy to see, and are not only limited to hindering efficiencies in the 
workplace, but may also render the rule hollow. 
4.3 A less than perfect disciplinary process is not the same as no process at all 
It is worth emphasising at the outset that Kruger was guilty of racism in the workplace 
and that he had a pre- dismissal hearing where he pleaded guilty. This was clear from 
the time the matter began at the CCMA all the way until it reached the Constitutional 
Court. Because this was common cause and because it is commonly accepted that calling 
a black person a kaffir in the workplace is so atrocious that it calls for a dismissal of the 
perpetrator62, perhaps the Constitutional Court should have considered, as do the 
English courts, if giving another hearing to Kruger in those circumstances would have 
made any difference at all in relation to the dismissal sanction he was challenging.63  
 
59  Schwartz v Sasol Polymers & others (2017) 38 ILJ 915 (LAC) at para 13. 
60  R v Ngwevela 1954 (1) SA 123 (A) at 131F. 
61  Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief 1958 (1) SA 546 (A) at 549C. 
62  See SARS (2017) at paras 48 and 49. 
63  See Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 All ER 1278 (HL) at 1294. 
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It is not beyond the realm of possibility that ,on these facts, giving Kruger a hearing 
prior to the substitution of the sanction would not have made any difference at all 
taking into account the gravity and seriousness of the offence for which he was 
dismissed and the constitutional obligations resting on SARS.64 If this were to be the 
case, and we strongly suspect it could have been, then it is difficult to imagine why 
Kruger would have been entitled to compensation only on account that he was not 
heard before the warning and suspension sanctions were substituted with a dismissal. A 
consideration of the totality of all that transpired from the time Kruger was charged 
with misconduct to the time he was dismissed, like the Court in National Union of 
Mineworkers & others v Power Construction (Pty) Ltd we find it “difficult to see how a 
formal … hearing could have made any difference”65 in relation to Kruger’s dismissal. 
Kruger was guilty of very serious misconduct in the workplace and some process, less 
than perfect we accept, had been followed before he was dismissed. 
It should never be forgotten that the reason labour law provides for hearings, pre- 
dismissal hearings in particular, is so that any misconduct complaint against an 
employee can be investigated and the employee concerned be afforded an opportunity 
to answer to the complaint. In National Union of Mine Workers v Durban Roodepoort 
Deep Ltd the then Industrial Court held: 
“The primary object of [a pre- dismissal] enquiry, whatever form it takes, is to 
endeavour to investigate any complaint against an employee, as honestly and as 
objectively as is possible, so that he or she is not dismissed for want of a just 
cause and without having been afforded a fair and a reasonable opportunity of 
speaking in rebuttal or in mitigation of the complaint ….”66 
A point the Constitutional Court omitted to emphasise in SARS (2017) was that SARS 
had arranged a form of enquiry for Kruger where he was heard. Because of this, it is not 
clear to us what would have been achieved if the SARS Commissioner heard from him 
again. It cannot be seriously said that hearing from Kruger again would have achieved a 
different standard of fairness that the disciplinary hearing did not afford him. To insist 
on fairness in the labour sphere requires a recognition that fairness “applies to both the 
employer and the employee”67.  In SARS (2017) the Constitutional Court appears to have 
veered only to the side of the employee.    
In leaning only on the side of the employee, the Constitutional Court allowed itself 
not only to benefit and protect one party in the employment relationship68, but also to 
 
64 Section 7 of the Constitution obliges SARS as an organ of State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights. For this reason, not acting against Kruger would have been a violation of 
SARS’s obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the workers’ rights to equality and dignity. See 
SARS (2017) at para 39.  
65  (2017) 38 ILJ 227 (LC) at para 72. 
66  (1987) 8 ILJ 156 (IC) at 164. 
67  Branford v Metrorail Services (Durban) (2003) 24 ILJ 2269 (LAC) at 2278H. 
68  Smit “How do you determine a fair sanction? Dismissal as appropriate sanction in cases of dismissal for 
(mis)conduct” 2011 De Jure 49 at 54. 
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be hamstrung by procedural fairness contrary to the warning made by Judge Lloyd QC 
that “[i]t is now settled law that the purpose of adjudication is not to be thwarted by an 
overly sensitive concern for procedural niceties”69.  
As important as procedural fairness is, it should also be remembered that the task 
and duty of adjudication is to arrive at a just outcome and procedural fairness should 
not be allowed to derail that ideal. The outcome of the SARS (2017) judgment is that 
taxpayers’ money was spent compensating a racist just because the Constitutional Court 
was overly sensitive to procedural niceties. We fail to see how such a judgment can be 
just. It is on this basis that we submit that the Constitutional Court ought to have 
pondered the question whether Kruger’s position in relation to the sanction would have 
been any different had he been afforded a hearing before the sanction imposed by the 
disciplinary chairperson was altered. Had this been considered, it is likely that the 
Constitutional Court would have come to the conclusion that compensation was not 
necessary because Kruger had been heard in a substantive sense and hearing from him 
again would not have made any difference to the validity of the dismissal he sought to 
challenge. Holding otherwise, as was unfortunately the case here, was nothing short of 
allowing form to prevail over substance and technicalities to trump justice. 
4.4 Court failed to consider impact of its judgment 
Judging under a system of law where the constitution is supreme is in many ways 
different from judging under a system of law that follows parliamentary supremacy. 
This is so because a supreme constitution generally places more responsibilities on 
judges than its parliamentary counterpart. This the Justices of the Constitutional Court 
appear to have forgotten in SARS (2017). Why else would they accentuate Kruger’s 
interests to a hearing above all else? Kruger, on Mogoeng CJ’s own characterisation, was 
an unrepentant racist in that he was “an employee who, though guilty of racism, did not 
acknowledge his racist conduct, [and] apologise to all concerned …”70. 
Despite this, the Constitutional Court still saw fit to award him compensation. This, 
we argue, is at odds with the transformative agenda our Constitutional Court is said to 
embrace and does little to foster good relations between black and white people. This is 
the case because it will always be difficult to explain to the racially oppressed black 
people how it came about that a white man who was guilty of the very thing that was at 
the heart of their oppression, racism and white supremacy, approaches the transformed 
courts administering the Constitution that is said to be transformative and have the 
Court find in his favour. Is that not an act of rewarding racists for practising their 
racism, will be the question. How equal or protected are black people before the law? 
What is transformative about the law and the Constitution that allows a racist to be paid 
money for being a racist?   
Judges have an active role to play in bringing about the vision the Constitution has 
for our country. To play their role meaningfully judges must recognise that the supreme 
 
69  Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v London Borough of Lambeth [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC) at para 27. 
70  See SARS (2017) at para 45. 
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Constitution, in addition to placing more responsibilities on them than was previously 
the case under the old order, also calls for a different legal culture and method of 
adjudication. Part of that different legal culture and method of adjudication must be that 
judges engage in an ongoing process of rethinking existing legal structures and forging 
adequate solutions to contemporary societal problems. This is in conjunction with the 
overarching duty on all judicial officers to do justice between the parties when 
adjudicating. It was Denning LJ in Jones v National Coal Board who correctly said that “a 
judge [when adjudicating] is not a mere umpire to answer the question ‘How’s that?’. 
His object above all is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law.”71 
It cannot be argued that the Constitutional Court in awarding compensation to 
Kruger for a dismissal that was not only substantively justified but was also appropriate 
in the circumstances did any justice between him, SARS and the broader society bound 
by the precedent this judgment now sets. Properly considered, the Constitutional Court 
in this case adopted a docile approach, ready to award compensation to Kruger just 
because SARS had committed a procedural blunder. In doing so, the Constitutional 
Court failed to consider the transformative imperatives it was bound to consider, and 
most importantly, the Justices failed to heed what was said about the role of a judge in R 
v Hepworth:  
“A Judge is an administrator of justice, he is not merely a figurehead, he has not 
only to direct and control the proceedings according to recognised rules of 
procedure but to see that justice is done.”72 
To do justice in a case like this required the Constitutional Court to recognise that not 
every procedural defect leads to a vitiation of the process or the outcome. Sometimes 
and if we are serious about using the Constitution to transform society, procedural 
flaws in the circumstances of a case like this become immaterial if the objective is to 
send a clear message to society that racism has no place in our society.  
It is clear to us that the Constitutional Court did not ponder the message such a 
judgment sends out to society. Many black people are to experience the impact of the 
judgment as the law having offered money to Kruger thereby rewarding him for being 
unashamedly racist in a country that is meant to be intolerant of racism. Part of doing 
justice between the parties and in accordance with the law involves ascertaining the 
impact of judgments and the messages such judgments send to society as a whole. The 
Constitutional Court as an apex court has a heightened responsibility to ensure that its 
judgments always send out clear and correct messages to society. Had this not been a 
requirement, then the total transformation of our society will never be achieved. 
Furthermore, although the sole responsibility a judge has in a system of law that 
observes parliamentary supremacy is, as Harms J says, to enforce and not to question 
 
71  Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 All ER 155 (CA) at 159B. 
72  R v Hepworth 1928 AD 265 at 277. 
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the law,73 this is rejected where the Constitution reigns supreme, and for good reason. 
In the process of enforcing and not questioning the law, our history tells us, a lot more 
harm than good was done. The courts were not racially representative of all the races of 
the population,74 the judgments handed down were pro-executive, human rights, 
especially those of black people, were trampled on, and the rule of law was 
compromised.75 All this was done to give expression to the will of the majority in 
Parliament.76 Because the judges could not question the law they also did not consider 
the impact of their judgments on society. The prevailing attitude was that it was not the 
function of courts and judges to be concerned with hardships caused by their judgments 
since their role was simply to apply the law. The supreme Constitution changes all this 
not only by demanding that judges be faithful to it and nothing else, but also by, in the 
words of Harms J, giving judges the latitude “to backchat when the lawgiver speaks – 
even coherently ”77.  
The SARS (2017) case is disappointing because the Constitutional Court did not use 
any of the mechanisms it had at its disposal to send a clear message to Kruger and all 
would be racists out there that racism will not be tolerated. Instead, the Court elected to 
pay the usual lip service to the scourge of racism. From its arsenal to achieve social 
transformation and to send clear messages to society the Constitutional Court could 
have fashioned an appropriate remedy that would have enabled it to do justice between 
the parties and also be firm in its rejection of racism.78 In previous cases the 
Constitutional Court had defined an appropriate remedy as one that fits the injury, that 
is fair to those affected, effectively vindicates rights, and is just and equitable in the light 
of the facts.79 None of these principles where applied in the SARS (2017) judgment. 
The power to fashion that appropriate remedy is found in section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. In Khumalo v Member of the Executive Council for Education: KwaZulu 
Natal (Khumalo (2014)) Skweyiya J held that section 172(1)(b) gave the Constitutional 
Court greater powers “to regulate any possible unjust consequences” that may ensue as 
a result of its orders.80 Whilst the Constitutional Court must declare conduct it finds 
 
73 See Harms LTC “Judging under a Bill of Rights: Ebsworth Memorial Lecture, 24 January 2007” (2009) 
12(3) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 4. 
74 Hlophe J “The role of judges in a transformed South Africa – problems, challenges and prospects”  
(1995) 112 South African Law Journal 22 at 23. 
75  Mpya M & Ntlama N “The evolution of the constitutional law principle of the ‘Rule of Law’ in the South 
African Constitutional Court” (2016) 31(1) Southern African Public Law 114 at 115. 
76  Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (E) at 598B. 
77 Harms LTC (2009) at 5; see also Nkosi T “Rule of Law, the mandament van spolie and the missed 
opportunity: some thoughts arising from Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security” (2016) 31(1) 
Southern African Public Law 157 at 165. 
78 See  Molaudzi v S 2015 (2) SACR 341 (CC) at para 33. 
79  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) at para 29. 
80 2014 (5) SA 579 (CC) at para 53 . 
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unconstitutional invalid, reasoned Skweyiya J, it need not always set such conduct 
aside.81  
The point we are making here is that in SARS (2017) the Constitutional Court could 
have concluded that Kruger’s procedural rights were violated, but it did not, as a matter 
of course, need to also conclude that compensation was due. The Court could have said 
that the misconduct for which Kruger had been dismissed was so vile that a 
compensation award was not appropriate as it would send a wrong message to society. 
This position would have been in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s previous 
ruling in Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA where it held that remedies to be 
granted in terms of section 193 of the LRA are , which means that a court is not obliged 
to award compensation pursuant to a finding that a dismissal was procedurally unfair.82 
The last point we make here is that the Constitutional Court will do well to always 
remember the following: 
“In [all organised] societies, people often rely on the courts of law to give 
direction in their disputes. How the court discharges this task will have a 
bearing on how the public views the whole justice system. In colonial times and 
later apartheid era, courts of law did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the black 
majority.”83 
The law and the courts of law of the bygone era were a source of black alienation 
because, amongst others, of the messages they were sending through their judgments. It 
is for this reason that we say courts, especially the Constitutional Court, must always 
pause to consider what messages it sends to society through its judgments, and whether 
those judgments embody the transformation called for by the Constitution. The 
credibility and legitimacy of the entire judicial system depends on that. 
4.5 Tough talk without consequences does little to eradicate racism 
The SARS (2017) judgment is an example of what has become daily practice in our 
courts: tough talk but no action. Our courts are yet to recognise that to reject racism 
decisive action rather than tough talk is necessary. But, to be fair, the stance adopted by 
our courts is probably informed by the way in which racial oppression was “defeated”. 
No decisive action underpinned that process.  
What is true is that the end of South Africa’s legalised racism came at a sacrifice. 
The victims of apartheid were asked to forego rightful criminal charges they so yearned 
to press against their oppressors, as well as all civil and delictual claims they had 
against the old regime.84 The beneficiaries of the old regime, on the other hand, were 
 
81  Khumalo (2014) at para 53. 
82 Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd. v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others 
2009 (1) SA 390 (CC) at para 48. 
83 See Mnyongani F “Duties of a lawyer in a multicultural society: a customary law perspective” (2012) 
23(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 352 at 359. 
84 Van der Walt J “Vertical sovereignty, horizontal constitutionalism, subterranean capitalism: a case of 
competing retroactivities” (2010) 26(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 102 at 127. 
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directed to drop their racist ideologies and get along with the black folk they once 
oppressed. No reparations were paid and no one took responsibility. Justice was 
suspended in pursuit of reconciliation, which reconciliation was forced and imposed by 
the political leaders.85 This is the background against which our constitutional order 
was born. 
The sacrifices made to achieve our constitutional order based on equality and non-
racialism were, however, not enough to obliterate the roots and influence of racism that 
have always bedevilled South Africa. Time and again, and SARS (2017) is an apt example 
of this, racism does raise its ugly head, calling upon the judiciary to act appropriately. 
The judiciary’s response has been, to say the least, inadequate and wholly ineffective. 
The best the judiciary has been able to do when adjudicating cases concerned with 
racism is to chastise and condemn racism in the strongest possible terms. Sadly though, 
as we see in this SARS (2017) judgment, that strong condemnation is not always 
followed through by the imposition of an equally strong and effective rehabilitative or 
deterrent sanction by our courts. 
Tough talk without appropriate consequences is nothing more than lip service. 
What is required to uproot and defeat racism is for the tough talk to be accompanied by 
an effective sanction. That is the only way in which inroads can be made against 
racism.86 Effective sanctions are crucial to the proper administration of justice. In this 
regard, as early as in 1906 Innes CJ held: 
“If Courts of law do not intervene effectively in cases … then one of two results 
will follow – either one man will avenge himself for an insult to himself by 
insulting the other, or else he will take the law into his own hands.”87 
We can only add that in cases of racism, which cases come with deep emotions and with 
feelings of exclusion, the dangers described by Innes CJ are more than real and forever 
present. A proper balance between condemnation and sanction must be found so that 
courts and the justice system itself do not lose credibility in the eyes of the people. 
Going further, in SARS (2017) Mogoeng CJ writes: 
“It bears repetition that the use of the word kaffir is the worst of all racial 
vitriols a white person can ever direct at an African in this country. To suggest 
that it is necessary for the employer to explain how that extremely abusive 
language could possibly break the trust relationship and render the 
employment relationship intolerable, betrays insensitivity ... Where such 
injurious disregard for human dignity and racial hatred is spewed by an 
 
85  See generally Woods JM “Reconciling reconciliation” (1998) 3 UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 81 at 81. 
86  See generally Nkosi T “Balancing deprivation of liberty and quantum of damages” (2013) De Rebus 62 
at 63-64. 
87  Botha v Pretoria Printing Works Ltd 1906 TS 710 at 714. 
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employee against his colleagues in a workplace, that ordinarily renders the 
relationship between the employee and the employer intolerable.”88 
It is difficult to reconcile such strong condemnation of Kruger’s racist conduct with the 
order the Constitutional Court eventually made. How is it possible that a racist bigot in 
Kruger’s position who had been found guilty of having committed what the 
Constitutional Court described as “the worst kind of verbal abuse ever”89 ends up being 
compensated for a dismissal that flowed from that verbal abuse? It boggles the mind, 
and the injustice embodied in such a decision far outweighs any value protected by 
procedural fairness. The only explanation for this odd outcome is to say that the 
Constitutional Court paid lip service to the seriousness of the issue at hand.  
The SARS (2017) judgment is comparable to , and in many ways reinforces what 
happened in, the appeal case of Prinsloo v S  (Prinsloo (2014)) where the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (SCA)  also spoke tough against racism but failed to give an effective order 
that could address the violation and potentially deter others from committing the same 
offence. The Court had this to say about racism and the use of the word kaffir by some 
white people when referring or talking to black people: 
“… I have no doubt that the appellant behaved in a high-handed and 
cantankerous manner, and further that he uttered the words attributed to him. 
The word kaffir is racially abusive and offensive and was used in its injurious 
sense. This was an unlawful aggression upon the dignity of the complainants. … 
In our racist past [the word kaffir] was used to hurt, humiliate, denigrate and 
dehumanise Africans. This obnoxious word caused untold sorrow and pain to 
the feelings and dignity of the African people in this country. … [S]uch conduct 
seeks to negate the valiant efforts made to break from the past and has no place 
in a country like ours which is founded upon the democratic values of human 
dignity, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”90 
Prinsloo, who was an attorney,91 was visiting one of the residences of the University of 
the Free State when he verbally abused three black women, a mother and her two 
daughters, by calling them “[j]ulle fucking kaffirs”92 whilst engaged in an argument over 
parking space. As a result of this verbal abuse, Prinsloo was charged and prosecuted for, 
amongst others, crimen injuria. He was accordingly convicted and sentenced. But for all 
his sins, Prinsloo was sentenced to a fine of a mere R 6000 or twelve months 
imprisonment, both of which were wholly suspended for a period of five years.  
It is a mystery that someone who was criminally convicted for such a vile offence is 
allowed by the SCA to walk away with a wholly suspended sentence. Only tough talk 
 
88  See SARS (2017) at para 46. 
89  See SARS (2017) at para 4. 
90  (5434/13) [2014] ZASCA at para 20. 
91 Prinsloo (2014) at para 4, Prinsloo, whilst engaged in an argument, apparently told the complainants 
that he would represent himself should there be any legal action against him since he was an attorney. 
92  Prinsloo (2014) at para 4. 
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against what he had done but no consequences at all. The tough talk, no consequences 
stance adopted by our courts does nothing to eradicate racism. Instead, and this we see 
in both the SARS (2017) and Prinsloo (2014) judgments, it makes racists crass and 
shameless in their conduct. At no point did Kruger and Prinsloo show any remorse or 
regret for their racism. Had they had any remorse, regret or shame for what they had 
done, they would not have allowed their cases to go to the two highest courts in the 
land. It is saddening if the two highest courts in the land promote this crass and 
shameless conduct by handing down orders and sentences that are ineffective in 
addressing the scourge of racism.  
Talking tough against racism by giving the history of the term kaffir in this country, 
its racist connotations, and its obnoxious implications on the lives of those against 
whom it is directed93 is, in the absence of corrective measures directed against the 
racist, extremely unhelpful. Those found guilty of racism must not only be called out but 
must also be helped by putting in place appropriate corrective measures to correct 
them and deter other would be racists, so that they do not offend again. Compensating 
Kruger, as the Constitutional Court did, will not correct his offensive racist views, nor 
will it deter other would- be racists.    
We should point out, lest we are misunderstood, that in criticising the tough talk no 
consequence approach to racism we are not calling for racists to be ostracised, but that 
the punishment must fit the racist and the gravity of his infraction.94 This is necessary in 
order to make meaningful gains in the fight against racism. The current judicial 
attitudes to racism have not only been too soft on racists, but have also been letting the 
victims of racism down. There needs to be an increase in consequences to arrest this 
crass and shameless conduct we are beginning to see amongst those found guilty of 
racist slurs. The consequences we are advocating for are many and varied, and could 
include, amongst others, ordering racists to work with the very same people and 
communities they despise so to learn the true value of non-racialism.95 The intention is 
for racists to be rehabilitated.      
Going further, the point we are making is that those found guilty of racist conduct 
must be made to realise the seriousness of their racist conduct; and what better way to 
achieve this than to make them render services to the very communities they despise.96 
Being made to pay for one’s racist sins in this way is better than any fine because it is 
personal and will certainly go a long way in protecting the community’s interests. Every 
time a racist performs community service in a black community, “he will perforce be 
 
93  SARS (2017) at para 53; Prinsloo (2014) at para 4. 
94  S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G. 
95  Compare this with the independent delict (tort) for racial slurs suggested by Delgado R “Words that 
wound: a tort action for racial insults, epithets and name calling” (1982) 17 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 133. 
96  S v Khumalo 1984 (4) SA 642 (W) at 645C. 
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reminded of his offence and the necessity to refrain from similar conduct in the 
future”97 .      
We are mindful that SARS (2017), unlike Prinsloo (2014), was not a criminal case, 
and for this reason the outcome there should have been a declaration that SARS was 
wrong in changing the sanction without affording Kruger a hearing, coupled with no 
compensation order, but with a costs order for such shameless conduct in allowing the 
matter to go all the way to the Constitutional Court when, on the objective facts, he was 
clearly guilty of racism in the workplace.98 That would have been a just and equitable 
order available to the Constitutional Court to make. Sadly, the Constitutional Court 
missed an opportunity to take such a decisive step and send a strong message to racists 
that technical arguments, masked as procedural unfairness, will not override or blunt 
the Court from tackling substantive injustices.  
5 CONCLUSION 
“When we are talking about a structure as deeply embedded as race, radical 
measures are required. ‘Everything must change at once’, otherwise the system 
merely swallows up the small improvement one has made, and everything 
remains the same.”99 
Mogoeng CJ spent a bit of time in SARS (2017) pondering if are we not “perhaps too soft 
on racism and the use of the word kaffir in particular?”100 This question would have 
been brought about by the rise of racial incidents we are seeing at all levels of our 
society. Although a concerted effort is required to fight racism, the judiciary has not 
come to the party. Judgments like SARS are disappointing as courts have not shown 
themselves courageous enough to tackle racism by doing more than just condemning it. 
Courts have not used their judicial discretion to reject racism by acting firmly against 
racists. Racists have successfully used the law and the courts to insulate themselves 
from the legal liability and just outrage that would otherwise flow from their racist acts. 
For this reason, the answer is “yes, we have been too soft on racism”. 
This article has attempted to show that there were principled and legally sound 
reasons militating against the Constitutional Court awarding compensation to Kruger. 
The fact that these trite legal principles escaped all the Justices can justifiably be read to 
mean that courts are going out of their way to accommodate racists. Further, we have 
also attempted to highlight areas of concern in the way in which cases involving racism 
have been handled by our judiciary and have called for some radical action on the part 
of the judiciary the next time racists make use of the law and come before the courts. 
Racism cannot be defeated incrementally through strong words of condemnation; firm 
 
97  S v Fraser 2005 (1) SACR 455 (SCA) at para 26. 
98  Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) held that not every declaration 
of invalidity must be followed by a set aside order. 
99  Delgado R & Stefancic J Critical race theory: an annotated biography New York: New York University 
Press (2001) at 57. 
100  SARS (2017) at para 9. 
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action is needed, and the approach should not be to try to soften the impact and effects 
of racism but to eliminate them. Elimination of racism is the end goal of a truly non-
racial South Africa and courts have a pivotal role to play in that regard. 
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